Each of these three effects of planetary defense programs on violent conflict risk can benefit from interaction between the communities that study and address NEO and violent conflict risks. Improved awareness of NEOs and communication between astronomers and military officials could help resolve NEO false alarms. False alarms mistaken as real attacks are a major concern, especially as a cause of nuclear war. Third, planetary defense could reduce violent conflict risk by addressing the possibility of NEO collisions being mistaken as violent attacks and inadvertently triggering violent conflict. However, the effect is difficult to assess, mainly due to ambiguities in violent conflict risk. The effect may be such that nuclear deflection/disruption would increase aggregate risks to human society. Second, the proposed use of nuclear explosions for NEO deflection and disruption could affect the role of nuclear weapons in violent conflict risk.
By documenting the history of its successes and failures, the planetary defense community can aid efforts to address other global risks, including but not limited to violent conflict. First, planetary defense may offer a constructive model for addressing a major global risk. This paper evaluates three potential effects of planetary defense programs on violent conflict risk. Insofar as planetary defense projects affect other risks besides NEOs, these other risks should be taken into account.
Arguably, the aim of planetary defense should be to make Earth safer from all threats, including but not limited to threats from near-Earth objects (NEOs). This paper provides the first-ever survey of the implications of violent conflict risk for planetary defense program decisions. The article offers new perspectives on expert vs public perceptions of risk impact assessment and policy analysis and precaution, policy learning and foresight. Further, optimal precaution against uncommons risks requires careful analysis to avoid misplaced priorities and potentially catastrophic risk-risk trade-offs. The article suggests a twist on conventional debates: in contrast to salient experienced risks spurring greater public concern than expert concern, rare uncommons risks exhibit greater expert concern than public concern. Normatively, the article argues that, for rare catastrophic risks, it is the inability to learn from experience, rather than uncertainty, that offers the best case for anticipatory precaution. Descriptively, this article identifies psychological heuristics and political forces that underlie neglect of rare catastrophic 'uncommons' risks, notably the unavailability heuristic, mass numbing, and underdeterrence. Although the problem of rare and global catastrophic risk has been much discussed, its sources and solutions need to be better understood. This article formulates a distinct type of problem: 'the tragedy of the uncommons', involving the misperception and mismanagement of rare catastrophic risks. Such tragedies can be overcome if societies learn through experience to mobilize collective action. The 'tragedy of the commons' is a classic type of problem, involving multiple actors who face individual incentives to deplete shared resources and thereby impose harms on others.